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Immediately following Mexico’s December
20, 1994, devaluation of the peso, some observ-
ers expressed detailed support for the move.
They conjectured that it would calm finan-
cial markets that had showed some signs of
volatility.
Mexican officials themselves treated the
devaluation as if it would have a stabilizing
influence. In presenting the devaluation, they
announced that the country’s erstwhile crawling
peg regime would remain in place, and that
the devaluation would represent only a change
in the weak-side edge of Mexico’s exchange
rate band.
In the United States, some analysts also
accepted Mexico’s initial devaluation as equili-
brating. Then Acting International Monetary Fund
Director Stanley Fischer noted Mexico’s initia-
tives as “an appropriate policy response to re-
cent market developments.…”1 MIT Professor
Rudiger Dornbusch, who had for some time
been advocating a Mexican devaluation, was
quoted as saying that now was the time for
“smart money” to move into Mexico, with the
currency at appropriate levels.2
But instead of inducing stability in finan-
cial markets, the initial devaluation triggered a
run on the currency. Foreign currency reserves
fell markedly. Mexican interest rates rose rap-
idly. The exchange rate moved well beyond
what advocates of Mexican devaluation
had said they thought sufficient.
While subsequent exchange rate and
interest rate reactions to Mexico’s initial devalu-
ation raised questions about how financial
markets operate, financial events preceding
Mexico’s initial devaluation of the peso also
offered anomalies. Financial markets typically
sense impending devaluations. This time, de-
spite concerns voiced occasionally that the
peso was overvalued, reports were widespread
that the timing had surprised financial mar-
kets3 and even that investors felt betrayed.4
This article considers factors that led to the
devaluation, examines why it seemed to sur-
prise markets, and addresses financial market
behavior in the wake of the peso devaluation. It
is useful to consider factors that led to devalua-
tion in the framework of the so-called impossi-
bility theorem. Recall that this theorem claims
that policy authorities cannot simultaneously and
continuously follow the three objectives of free
capital mobility, fixed exchange rates, and an
independent monetary policy.
I detail why policymakers might reason-
ably conclude that Mexico could possibly
pursue limited episodes of monetary indepen-
T his article considers factors that
led to Mexico’s December 1994
devaluation, examines why it seemed
to surprise markets, and addresses
financial market behavior in the
wake of the peso devaluation.
It is useful to consider factors that
led to devaluation in the framework
of the so-called impossibility theorem.20
dence—even if the impossibility theorem ulti-
mately could not be denied—and why the pos-
sibility could have been permitted to become a
reality. Nevertheless, when witnessing a finan-
cial panic like Mexico’s, it may require effort to
recall that exchange rate devaluation is a matter
of choice. A central bank can always maintain a
pegged exchange rate. The price is contraction
in the monetary base or, equivalently, a persis-
tently high interest rate.5
This article outlines the rise of priorities
that came to dominate the preservation of the
Mexican exchange rate regime. Specifically, al-
ready high real interest rates, resulting increases
in nonperforming loan rates, and the implica-
tions of all of these factors for commercial bank
solvency seem in part to have motivated credit
creation at times in 1994 while the United States
was tightening credit.
Mexico’s pre-devaluation exchange rate
and monetary policy independence
While the impossibility theorem posits that
policy authorities cannot simultaneously and
continuously follow the three objectives of free
capital mobility, fixed exchange rates, and an
independent monetary policy—the meaning of
the term continuously complicates matters for
anyone who wants to analyze Mexico. How
continuous does continuous have to be?
Before the December 1994 devaluation,
Mexico’s exchange rate was essentially pegged
to the U.S. dollar, but Mexico gave itself what
appeared to be some room to maneuver. In
pegging the peso to the dollar, Mexico was
announcing its intent to cede some control over
its monetary policy to the United States. One
advantage of taking this step and then persisting
with it is to establish credibility that, in general,
noninflationary policies would be in place.
If Mexico had fixed its exchange rate policy
hard and fast to the dollar, it would have been
fully ceding its monetary policy to the United
States. But in fact, Mexico permitted its ex-
change rate to fluctuate within a band whose
weak-side edge devalued at 0.0004 pesos per
dollar. With a band, Mexico’s central bank could
run expansionary or contractionary monetary
policies different from those of the U.S. central
bank—provided that the resulting movements in
the exchange rate remained within the band—
and still maintain exchange rate credibility.
An important detail of Mexico’s monetary
independence, however, involved what may be
seen as its term structure. U.S. short-term rates
appear not to have an influence on Mexican
short-term or long-term interest rates, but U.S.
long-term rates seem to influence Mexican long-
term interest rates.6
To the extent that these data suggested
limited financial integration in short-term mar-
kets, Mexico may have perceived itself able to
pursue a relatively independent monetary policy
in the short run. In any case, as will be detailed,
Mexico did pursue a monetary policy in the
second half of 1994 that was inconsistent with
the United States’ increasingly restrictive approach
to money market intervention.
The implications of the U.S. long-term
debt to Mexican long-term debt relations sug-
gest that Mexico’s monetary policy could not
remain independent in the longer term—at
least not in a pegged exchange rate regime.
Once the United States moved its long rates,
Mexico would have to follow quickly or face
large capital outflows. There is much to suggest
that political factors contributed to the day-to-
day changes in capital outflows that ultimately
occurred but, in the end, monetary policy in




stabilizations are very difficult to pursue effec-
tively over protracted periods. In programs like
Mexico’s, devaluation is not unusual, even when
care is taken to address their typical problems
by using exchange rate pegging as only a part of
the overall program. In Mexico, pegging was an
important element of a broader program that
included reduced government spending, tax re-
form, deregulation, privatization, and significant
trade liberalization—including rapid reductions
in tariffs and quotas and entry into the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and
later into the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA).
Fiscal stabilization preceded the exchange-
rate-based stabilization efforts. The history of
exchange-rate-based stabilization in the South-
ern Cone countries had suggested that a single
nominal anchor—such as the exchange rate—
could be inadequate to motivate quick dis-
inflation. Policy incredibility (that firms would
not believe the exchange rate regime would
persist) as well as backward indexation and
nonsynchronized price-setting could lead to
persistent inflation (Calvo and Végh 1992).
Accordingly, an important component of
Mexico’s stabilization policy was the Pacto. Un-
der this government-organized accord, repre-
sentatives of the business community agreed to
limit price increases, the government made com-FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 21 ECONOMIC REVIEW  FIRST QUARTER 1996
mitments about the exchange rate and public-
sector prices, and labor representatives agreed
to limit wage increases.
Although there are historical exceptions,
exchange-rate-based stabilization programs that
also include incomes policies—like the Pacto—
fairly commonly result in a specific dynamic of
consumption and investment patterns, current
account movements, and exchange rate pres-
sures. The typical pattern (Calvo and Végh 1992
and Kiguel and Liviatin 1992) includes the fol-
lowing:
1. Despite reductions in inflation, the real
exchange rate rises because some infla-
tion remains and is not offset by nomi-
nal exchange rate movements.
2. The trade and current account balances
deteriorate.
3. In the early stages of the program, capi-
tal inflows finance the excess of con-
sumption and investment over domestic
production, allowing a boom to ensue,
but the inflows ultimately reverse.
4. With this reversal, the growing current
account deficit can no longer be financed,
and the consumption boom ends.
In recognition of this instability, a literature
has developed to suggest that exchange rate
pegging ought to be a temporary stabilization
tool, ultimately followed by a managed float
(McLeod and Welch 1991) or that, if pegging is
done at all, the exchange rate crawl should be
partially indexed to a measure of domestic prices
(Kamin 1991). Ultimately, it has been argued,
“As useful as exchange rate pegging is at the
outset, it is equally important to eliminate it as
soon as possible” (Dornbusch and Werner 1994,
281).
Trade and capital flows. Although Mexico’s
program of exchange rate stabilization cum in-
comes policy and trade liberalization contained
elements particular to the country, the ensuing
economic trajectory was typical of heterodox
programs. Consistent with the intentions of such
plans, inflation fell markedly—from 159.2 per-
cent in 1987 to 8 percent in 1993. By the third
quarter of 1994, the annualized inflation rate
had declined to 7 percent.
Mexico’s trade liberalization was a part of
this disinflation effort. Oligopoly typifies the or-
ganization of domestic markets in Mexico, and
price controls could risk product shortages.
Mexico used trade liberalization to enforce price
discipline—so as to hold down inflation and to
lower the likelihood of product shortages.
Moreover, the country’s exchange rate
policy played a disinflationary role in the con-
text of trade liberalization. The government con-
sistently depreciated the peso more slowly than
the rate of inflation—or than the difference
between the U.S. and Mexican inflation rates.
Consequently, as is common in exchange-rate-
based stabilization programs, real exchange rate
appreciation was chronic. Since real exchange
rate appreciation meant that foreign products
were increasingly cheaper than Mexican prod-
ucts, this exchange rate policy motivated do-
mestic producers—at least of tradable goods—
to resist the temptation to raise prices.
Figure 1 depicts a simple real exchange
rate measure—wholesale prices in Mexico rela-
tive to those in the United States, both as mea-
sured in dollars. By the end of 1993, Mexico’s
real exchange rate exceeded the maximum rate
that preceded Mexico’s megadevaluation epi-
sodes of 1982.
Partially because of this tension between
inflation and the pace of exchange rate depre-
ciation, the nation’s merchandise trade balance
grew increasingly negative (Figure 2). As may
be expected in an economy that had reoriented
itself toward a market system—and had de-
regulated, privatized, and generally rationalized
its policies toward the private sector—a sig-
nificant portion of Mexico’s current account
deficit reflected purchases of capital goods. The
increased productivity and efficiency that these
purchases imply resulted in steady increases in
exports. But the capital imports share of total
imports was still only 16.9 percent in 1993,
versus 71.1 percent for intermediate goods and
12 percent for consumer goods.
The trade and current account deficits were
possible because the rationalization of Mexico’s
fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies had
Figure 1
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helped stimulate large inflows of foreign in-
vestment funds through early 1994. These flows
also gave Mexico the reserves it would need to
defend the peso later, if exchange rate pressures
required it.
Increased capital inflows are common to
chronic inflation countries that introduce ex-
change-rate-based stabilization programs. Most
of these flows (Figure 3) into Mexico involved
portfolio investment—inflows typically for the
purchase of bonds and stocks—rather than for-
eign direct investment. While portfolio invest-
ment permitted Mexican enterprises to fund
privately owned toll roads, the recently priva-
tized telephone company, and some manufac-
turing operations, the focus of this investment
on the production of nontradables made inflows
and outflows susceptible to concerns of devalu-
ation risk.
But to the extent that capital is not per-
fectly mobile, Mexico’s chronically low and, in
the 1990s, falling saving rate meant that the
country’s investment and growth were more
susceptible to external financial events. There is
much to suggest that capital flows into Mexico
did not occur solely because of Mexico’s poli-
cies. During the early 1990s, foreign capital
began to flow into Latin America generally,
despite wide differences in macroeconomic
policies and economic performance among
countries there. An important reason appears
to be low U.S. interest rates, suggesting that
increases in U.S. interest rates might have the
opposite effect.7
Central bank policy and the financial
sector. One reason tensions surfaced be-
tween Mexico’s exchange rate regime and other
policies is that international elements of
Mexico’s disinflation programs—trade liberali-
zation, real exchange rate appreciation, and a
trade deficit financed by foreign capital in-
flows—collectively weakened Mexico’s finan-
cial sector.
Three factors converged to impose pres-
sures on Mexico’s financial sector. First, differ-
ences between the pricing performance of the
nontradables and tradables sectors damaged
the latter. The increased international compe-
tition held down prices in the tradable goods
sectors. But even with the Pacto, prices of
nontradable products, including real estate and
some services, rose relative to prices of trad-
ables. This disparity imposed profit squeezes
on tradables firms because they often used
nontradables as inputs, and because nontrad-
ables producers could bid up wages of work-
ers for whom tradables firms had to compete.
The direct effects of trade liberalization and
real exchange rate appreciation had, of course,
also imposed cost-price-squeeze pressures on
some of these firms. These pressures were
expressed in increasing loan defaults by trad-
ables firms.
Second, to maintain inflows of foreign
capital, real interest rates began to increase start-
ing in 1992, even though nominal rates were
falling at this time. During the early 1990s,
Mexico’s commercial banking system did not, at
least by developed country standards, behave
very competitively.8 Spreads between cost of
funds and loan rates were large. So were return
on assets, return on equity, and other income
statement ratios (Mansell Carstens 1993; Gruben,
Welch, and Gunther 1994). Bank lending rates
were typically very high by the standards of
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in real rates made it particularly difficult for
some firms to compete with foreign producers
from countries where financial costs happened
to be lower.
Third, to take advantage of the consump-
tion boom of the early 1990s, Mexico’s finan-
cial institutions had issued many more credit
cards—to the wrong borrowers. By the stan-
dards of developing companies, the reporting of
consumer credit histories was relatively sketchy
and unorganized in Mexico. Defaults became
common.
These factors converged to pressure
Mexico’s banking system.9 Just between the
fourth quarter of 1992 and the third quarter of
1994, the percentage of nonperforming loans
rose from 5.6 percent to 8.3 percent.10 Moreover,
between December 1991 and September 1994,
the ratio of high-risk assets to bank net worth
rose from 51 percent to 70 percent.
Banking system problems like these take
on special significance anywhere a central bank
is both monetary authority and, as in Mexico,
administrator of the deposit insurance system.
As Heller (1991) argues, to the extent that a
central bank is not only the nation’s monetary
authority but also is responsible for the health of
the banking system, policy tensions may exist.
Even though central banks are typically com-
mitted to the restraint of monetary expansion,
and Mexico’s is, an incipient banking crisis may
create incentives to expand credit to the bank-
ing system.
It is here that the tensions expressed in the
impossibility theorem appear, since it holds that
free movement of capital, independent mone-
tary policy, and a pegged exchange rate are
sooner or later incompatible. Mexico followed a
sterilization rule for its inflows of foreign re-
serves. To impose a monetary stabilization rule
atop the exchange rate based stabilization, accu-
mulations of foreign currency reserves were ster-
ilized via offsetting reductions in domestic credit
the central bank created for the financial system.
Conversely, outflows of foreign currency reserves
were sterilized through offsetting increases in
domestic credit.11,12
Recall that a central bank can always main-
tain a pegged exchange rate, but sometimes the
price is otherwise undesirably tight monetary
policy. Outflows of foreign currency reserves,
even if for purely political reasons, can signal
that a monetary contraction or interest-rate in-
crease is in order.13 Such policies can be incon-
sistent with the expansion of domestic credit as
an offset to capital outflows, even if the policy is
purely an act of sterilization.14
The currency configuration of
Mexican short-term debt
Mexico has simultaneously issued short-
term, peso-denominated debt (cetes) and short-
term dollar-indexed debt (tesobonos), but as
1994 progressed, Mexico radically altered the
currency configuration of its short-term debt so
as to strengthen the peso. In January 1994, the
dollar value of cetes outstanding was $12.9
billion, compared with $302 million in teso-
bonos. By November, cetes outstanding had
fallen to $7.27 billion, while tesobonos had
risen to $12.9 billion.
An interesting characteristic of these debt
issues, as demonstrated econometrically (Dorn-
busch and Werner 1994), is that the changes
in spreads between their interest rates are not
affected by changes in factors normally associ-
ated with exchange rate expectations. Dornbusch
and Werner (1994) argue that changes in spreads
between the interest rates of cetes and teso-
bonos are not explained by changes in the real
exchange rate or in Mexico’s trade balance be-
cause the government managed the compo-
sition of its domestic debt so as to respond to
cost differentials. That is, as exchange rate risk
rose, Mexico shifted its composition of short-
term debt toward tesobonos and away from
cetes. The authors argue that this shift reflects
government responses to cost differentials. As
rates on tesobonos fell relative to rates on cetes,
the government replaced cete issues with teso-
bono issues.
If one advantage of a shift toward teso-
bonos was to save on interest expenses while
gaining foreign exchange by selling debt to for-
eigners, it was not the only advantage. Mexico’s
increased issuance of tesobonos may also be
seen as making its exchange rate regime more
credible by imposing a clear and obvious fiscal
penalty for devaluation.
Ize and Ortiz (1987) note that devaluation
is tantamount to a default on domestic debt
because, by raising the price level, the govern-
ment erodes the debt’s real value. Accordingly, a
large overhang of domestic debt may be seen as
a motivation to devalue, particularly when the
debt is held by foreigners.
While this motivation may exist when a
nation’s domestic debt is denominated in the
home currency, the motivation erodes if, as with
the tesobonos, the debt instrument is indexed
to the dollar. A shift out of cetes and into
tesobonos is a shift out of an instrument for
which outstanding real debt falls with devalua-
tion and into an instrument for which devalua-
tion means a real debt increase. This statement24
holds whenever the subsequent rate of inflation
does not match or exceed the rate of devalua-
tion by the time the debt matures.
The tesobono shift’s role in enhancing cred-
ibility that the exchange rate regime will
persist may be indirectly measurable. Insofar as
agents recontract for higher wages or higher
purchase or selling prices now in anticipation of
a generalized bout of price increases—so that
present prices reflect expectations of future
price increases—and insofar as a devaluation
may be seen as triggering a future generalized
bout of price increases, the implications of a
shift into tesobonos as a commitment tech-
nology for the exchange rate regime may be
expressed in current price increases.15
Preliminary econometric research by David
Gould shows that, even when monetary base
growth and other factors linked to inflation are
included in a model of Mexican consumer price
changes, a negative and significant relation ex-
ists between consumer inflation and the share of
Mexican short-term debt that is indexed to the
dollar. That is, with this credibility enhancement
in place, the market seems to reduce its expecta-
tion of the devaluation and so of the inflation
that typically follows devaluation.16 It does not
seem unreasonable to conjecture that this cred-
ibility enhancement could also have been seen
as a potential enhancement for transitory mon-
etary independence.
Putting the pieces together
The implications of the general dynamics
of heterodox exchange-rate-based stabilization
programs, of the role of domestic credit expan-
sion in addressing systemic bank crises and in
triggering currency collapses, and of the use of
tesobonos as a commitment technology become
more dramatic when we consider the roles they
played in Mexico in 1994.
Recall that typical patterns of exchange-
rate-based stabilization programs include falling
inflation, rising real exchange rates, consump-
tion booms, capital inflows in the early stages
that fund increasingly negative balances of trade
and current account and, finally, capital out-
flows that ultimately induce currency collapses.
Recall also that a typical characteristic of a cur-
rency collapse is not the impossibility of main-
taining a pegged exchange rate, but a policy
priority rearrangement in which the exchange
rate is subordinated.
Finally, note that the intention of this ar-
ticle is not only to explain why the choices were
made that triggered the devaluation, but to ex-
plain why its aftermath was explosive despite
prior claims that “the Mexican government would
not lose credibility from a devaluation, because
it would be recognized as a constructive re-
sponse to a crisis.” 17
I noted earlier that one reason Mexican
bonds and stocks attracted U.S. and other for-
eign investors was low U.S. interest rates. Dur-
ing first-quarter 1994, U.S. monetary policy began
to tighten, raising U.S. interest rates and attract-
ing capital back to the United States. While the
increase in U.S. rates signified that factors push-
ing capital toward Mexico were diminishing,
political events in Mexico weakened the country’s
pull effects for capital.
Chiapas rebels may not have threatened
the nation’s stability, but the assassination of
Mexican presidential candidate Colosio in March
1994 was another matter to investors. After ris-
ing earlier in the year, reserves fell profoundly
just after the assassination but stabilized in April.
To hold foreign capital in the country, Mexico
raised interest rates significantly, signaling that
exchange-rate preservation remained important.
But U.S. interest rates were also rising, and they
continued to do so throughout the year. The ex-
change rate moved toward the weak edge of the
band but remained within it.
It is in this context of rising U.S. rates at a
time when increasing financial problems offered
motivations to lower or at least hold Mexican
rates that the value of the tesobonos as a com-
mitment technology can be appreciated. Instead
of offering a commitment technology based on
the accumulation of larger foreign currency re-
serves to defend the peso, when real rates were
already at high levels, the issuance of tesobonos
might be thought a reasonable substitute, at
least temporarily.
Figure 4
Real Central Bank Domestic Credit
To Commercial Banks
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When the Colosio assassination triggered a
capital outflow, Mexico sterilized by raising do-
mestic credit (Figure 4). At the same time, Mexico
stepped up its substitution of dollar-indexed
tesobonos outstanding for peso-indexed cetes
outstanding (Figure 5). By midyear, tesobonos
outstanding began to exceed cetes. The substi-
tution increased through the rest of the year.
In the third quarter, Mexico began to relax
its interest rate pressures, as can be seen from
Figure 6. Interest rates remained considerably
higher than they had been at the beginning
of the year. But they were not high enough
to restore reserves to the levels of the first
quarter—not, at least, when U.S. rates were
also rising.
Nevertheless, reserves remained relatively
stable during the third quarter. One reason may
be that, as the summer ensued, it became more
obvious that substitute Institutional Revolution-
ary Party presidential candidate Ernesto Zedillo
was likely to defeat the other candidates, whose
abilities or policies may have inspired more
investor uncertainty about future growth. Then,
in August, he did win. But Gould’s (1994) results
on the negative influence of tesobonos’ share
of total short-term debt on inflation rates sug-
gest than an exchange rate commitment tech-
nology also helped stabilize foreign currency
reserves. The third quarter ended with foreign
currency reserves as high as those with which
it had begun.
As 1994 ensued, the differential between
Mexican and U.S. interest rates began to fall,
much as one might expect, other things being
equal, as a reasonable policy response in the
face of mounting problems in the Mexican
financial system (Figure 7 ).18 Nominal cetes
rates fell absolutely in August and remained
below their spring and summer highs until the
devaluation.
In the fourth quarter, another political
event preceded capital outflows from Mexico,
but a concurrent economic event makes inter-
pretation difficult. After the assassination
of Institutional Revolutionary Party official
Carlos Francisco Ruiz Massieu, his brother was
appointed to investigate the case; in November
he resigned, alleging that powerful officials
were stymieing his investigation. Meanwhile, on
November 15 the Federal Open Market Commit-
tee of the U.S. Federal Reserve System met and
decided on policies that would lead to a
75-basis-point increase in the federal funds
rate, its most restrictive monetary policy action
since 1990.
Figure 5
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NOTE: Data are quarterly.26
In sterilizing the subsequent outflow of
foreign capital, Mexico’s central bank again in-
creased domestic credit to the banking system.19
Mexican interest rates were not pushed up suffi-
ciently to maintain reserves.
Perhaps as a result of the fiscal implica-
tions that the large overhang of tesobonos
offered in the event of a devaluation, the ex-
change rate continued to show signs of credibil-
ity.20 But this tesobono commitment technology
had been imposed in a period of increasing risk
to the financial system and of the additional
trade balance pressures partially induced by
the commencement of NAFTA in January 1994.
Taken collectively, these factors meant that
Mexico could be risking a financial crisis if it
devalued the currency and allowed interest rates
to go where they would, or if it defended the
currency by raising interest rates.
On December 20, the tesobono overhang
that had suggested exchange rate credibility now
signified financial market as well as currency
collapse. When the Mexican government an-
nounced that the peso would move from 3.47
pesos per dollar to 3.99, it also announced that
the exchange rate pegging regime, in which the
peso would devalue against the dollar at a rate
of 0.0004 pesos per day, would persist. The
band would simply be lowered.
But instead of settling markets, the an-
nouncement incited massive capital flight. Large
increases in interest rates ensued. Perhaps the
fiscal implications of the tesobono overhang,
with a maturity schedule in which the value of
tesobonos falling due within the first six months
of 1995 exceeded the value of Mexico’s foreign
exchange reserves, were calculated by financial
markets (Table 1). But given the moderate
magnitude of the initial announced devaluation,
the pure act of abridgment of such a commit-
ment seems to have played an important role in
and of itself.
Conclusion
The chief problems Mexico faced in 1994
were that the controlled rate of depreciation of
the peso was inconsistent with the persistent
inflation rate differential between the United
States and Mexico, that capital outflows drew
down foreign exchange reserves that Mexico
was using to defend the peso, and that, in the
conflict between greater monetary tightness to
support the exchange rate and less tightness to
avoid further financial-sector problems and a
downturn in the economy, the latter won out.
While Mexico wished growth, it was caught in
an episode of U.S. monetary tightening that
only de facto monetary independence would
have permitted it to avoid following with a
vengeance—and in financially destabilizing epi-
sodes of political unrest.
Despite evidence that some monetary in-
dependence was available transitorily, as the
short run grew into a longer run, independence
and dependence collided with a result long
since posited as the impossibility theorem. But
while these factors are consistent with an ensu-
ing devaluation, they alone are not consistent
with the explosive nature of Mexico’s financial
crisis in the wake of the initial devaluation.
The explosive nature of the crisis seems
to have been linked to reactions to the term
structure and volume of Mexico’s short-term
dollar-indexed debt, even though there is little
evidence to suggest that the tesobono debt
was seen as problematic before the devalua-
tion and that it had served as a positive commit-
ment technology.21 That the tesobono maturity
schedule signified obligations in early 1995 that
were considerably in excess of Mexican dollar
reserves to cover them may have triggered the
anticipation of a financial musical chairs game
in which each investor began to fear that her
or his tesobono would be the one left out of
convertibility.
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lates dollar reserves. If pressures to devalue arise,
Banco de México can use its dollar reserves to buy up
pesos—raising their dollar price. Also, squeezing
monetary growth and raising interest rates lower
Mexican inflation. Insofar as dollar prices of Mexican
goods rise faster than dollar prices of U.S. goods, both
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Mexican products and encouraged to buy U.S. pro-
ducts. The resulting trade deficit increase means de-
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ever, thirty-year U.S. Treasury bonds do Granger-
cause Mexican Brady par bonds, which, it should be
noted, may be seen as long-term bonds. These results
suggest that financial integration between Mexico and
the United States can be significantly abridged in the
short term but not in the long run.
7 For a more complete discussion of external factors
leading to such flows, see Calvo, Leiderman, and
Reinhart (1993); Chuhan, Claessens, and Mamingi
(1994); and Dooley, Fernandez-Arias, and Kletzer
(1994). Most foreign capital flowing into Latin America
did go to Mexico, however.
8 With the exception of union-owned Banco Obrero and
U.S.-owned Citibank, the entire Mexican commercial
banking system was nationalized in 1982. With a series
of consolidations, the original fifty-three nationalized
banks were pared to eighteen. These eighteen institu-
tions were privatized, one by one, in 1991 and 1992.
9 For a fuller development of the links between Mexico’s
banking problems and the subsequent exchange rate
crisis, see Calvo and Mendoza (1995).
10 In the United States, once a loan goes into arrears, the
entire remaining loan balance is considered in arrears.
In contrast, Mexico’s calculation procedure does not
consider the entire remaining loan balance to be in
arrears. For example, in Mexico, if a loan is three
months in arrears, only the balance that had been
contracted to be paid during those three months is
calculated as in arrears. Any loan balance scheduled
to be paid thereafter is not yet calculated as in arrears.
Other things being equal, U.S. protocols would some-
times result in higher past-due loan ratios than Mexi-
can protocols.
11 Banco de México (1995, 64) notes that “the increase in
domestic credit in 1994 occurred in response to re-
serve declines” and that reserves “did not fall because
domestic credit was expanded” [author’s translation].
12 While I am presenting a case for the possibility of
separation between reserve outflows and the domestic
credit creation that is implied by sterilization, it is true
that some argue that when central banks sell reserves,
they must sterilize automatically.
13 Kamin and Rogers (1995) offer econometric evidence
to suggest that when interest rates did rise, they rose
only moderately less than could be predicted by the
authorities’ standard reaction function. Kamin and
Rogers argue that, to have maintained the peg, the
authorities would have had to intensify their responses
to exchange market developments. That is, policy-
makers would have had to alter their reaction regime,
and they would have had to at a time when concerns
for the health of the banking system would have
suggested a relaxation of monetary policy.
14 While the merits and liabilities of currency boards are
a subject beyond the scope of this article, one disci-
pline they impose is that when foreign exchange
reserves flow out, the resulting reduction in the stock
of money is not offset. Although such boards may be
seen as having significant liabilities, Argentina’s peso
(which is disciplined by a currency board) has main-
tained its nominal value over the past two years while
Mexico’s has not.
15 Brown and Whealan (1993) offer econometric evi-
dence to suggest, for example, that present oil prices
reflect agent expectations of futures prices.
16 Lustig (1995, 379) notes that “this dollarization of
internal debt probably explains the surprising stability
of international reserves before such adverse events
as the increase of foreign interest rates and domestic
political unrest” [author’s translation]. Moreover,
Banco de México (1995, 69) states that “the issuance
of tesobonos was carried out in order to reduce
exchange market pressures” [author’s translation].
17 Werner (1994, 310).
18 Recall that inasmuch as a central bank can always
preserve a pegged exchange rate through a sustained
high interest rate or a contraction in monetary base,
interest rates insufficient to prevent declining reserves
suggest that other policies must dominate a com-
mitment to a pegged exchange rate. Garber and
Svensson (1994, 29) note that one of these policies
may be “the preservation of solvency of a banking
system.”
19 The capital outflows were not well-known, however,
and a number of analysts have complained that
something kept Mexico during the latter portions of
1994 from releasing data on central bank holdings of
foreign reserves.
20 Interest rates typically reflect nervousness about
devaluations. Consider, for example, the movement of28
yields on the twenty-eight day cetes auction for the
following dates: November 9—13.49 percent, Novem-
ber 16—13.45 percent, November 23—13.95 percent,
November 29—13.85 percent, December 7—13.30
percent, and December 14—13.75 percent.
21 Calvo and Mendoza (1995) and Sachs, Tornell, and
Velasco (1995) address other aspects of the sudden
and explosive nature of Mexico’s financial crisis that
clearly deserve attention. Calvo and Mendoza argue
that this phenomenon reflects, among other things, a
trade-off between diversification and information that
investors face when information is costly to acquire.
As investment opportunities expand across countries,
the payoff to purchasing information about a particular
country declines. It becomes rational for investors to
become sensitive to even “small” bad news, especially
when it follows previous bad news, even if none of the
news is related to fundamentals. In sum, the reduced
incentives to acquire much information about Mexico
in particular and Latin America in general motivated a
herd behavior that triggered the tequila effect.
Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1995) argue that,
while real disequilibria and reserve erosion lay the
groundwork for the crisis, the timing and magnitude
of the crisis came from a self-fulfilling panic after the
government ran up its short-term tesobono debt and
ran down gross reserves. That is, like Calvo and
Mendoza (1995) and those cited at the beginning of
this article, Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1995, 7) do
not believe that the crisis was fully consistent with
fundamentals. Instead, they conclude, “the panic
was self-fulfilling in that expectations of a run on both
pesos and teso-bonos by other agents led each
individual investor to engage in the same kind of
speculative behavior.”
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